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For many years you have been regarded as one of
the leading advocates of a strict <monetary’ approach
to economic policy. Together with Professor Meltzer
you have played a leading part in bringing the
monetarist approach to a wider public, both through
the Shadow Open Market Committee in the United
States and in the past two years in Europe through
the Shadow European Economic Policy Committee
(SEEPC), How much progre.rs has been made in
persuading public opinion of the merits of mane-
tarism?
Economic policy covers a wide range of measures
and the proper role of monetary policy should be
clearly recognised. Public opinion occasionally inter-
prets ‘monetarism’ as a view attributing to money
and monetary policy an all-embracing power. This
involves a serious misconception. Monetarist analysis
essentially empbasises two aspects of the range of
policy problems: the relation between monetary
growth and the basic rate of inflation, and the rela-
tion between monetary acceleration (or unanticipated
monetary growth) and temporary changes in output
and employment. The first relation determines mone-
tarist propositions about anti-inflationary policies. The
second relation determines, on the other hand, pro-
posals bearing on a stable and predictable course of
monetary policy. Monetarist analysis implies more-
over that monetary manipulation cannot raise the
trend of real growth. Neither is monetary expansion
a useful device under current circumstances to raise
investment expenditures. The falling trend of real
growth and investment expenditures is probably
dominated by the persistent erosion of the ‘rules of
the game’ required for a well-functioning market
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economy. The pervasive uncertainty about economic
policy and the gradual attrition of property rights
lower real growth and raise the normal level of un-
employment. This trend is reinforced by many gov-
ernmental measures which affect relative wages and
prices.
It often seems as if public opinion is largely on the
side of the monetarists norc while public policy con-
tinues to be inflationary, How do you explain this?
I doubt that a major portion of ~public opinion’
fully accepts the monetarist perspective in matters
bearing on monetary policy and monetary events,
The English establishment, including the media,
cling, with a few exceptions, to the ancient Keynesian
story. But let us consider the position of the bureauc-
racies and officials involved in the formulation and
execution of monetary policy. They will find no
reason to change their accustomed conceptions and
procedures in the absence of serious costs or dangers
to their position. The bureaucracies and policy insti-
tutions have a strong incentive to persist with their
established pattern. The consequence of their mis-
judgments are usually borne by others. Changes in
the conceptions governing an established institution
usually require a major crisis, which encourages
probing questions and a wide-ranging public debate,
combined with a change in the management of the
bureaucracy.
How woulA you sum up the present state of the
debate?
Indeed, the discussion continues. It continues in
scholarly journals and in the arena of public debate.
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But it is important to understand that the nature
of the discussion has gradually shifted over the years.
Substantial propositions originally advanced by mone-
tarist analysis have been incorporated into profes-
sional thinking in the United States. Keynesian
analysis still thrives on the other hand, even in archaic
forms, in Germany and England. The meshing of
ideas occurring between centres of active research
has, however, unavoidably shifted the focus of the
relevant issues over the past years. Three problems
have, in my judgment, emerged from recent debates
with a force requiring future attention by scholars.
These problems are
(i) the possibility and usefulness of an activist ap-
proach to policy based on optimal control
techniques;
(ii) the relative stability of the private and govern-
ment sector;
(iii) the relevant perspective bearing on the be-
haviour of the government sector.
A neo-Keynesian position asserts the potential of
optimal control techniques and an activist approach
to policy-making. The Keynesian tradition also asserts
the need for a stabilising government sector to con-
tain or offset the inherent instability of the private
sector. Lastly, this tradition reflects a conception of
government expressed by the ‘public interest’ or ‘good-
will’ thcory of government behaviour. This theory as-
sumes that bureaucracies and politicians in general
attempt to maximise social welfare. The alternative
position rejects this neo-Kcynesian perspective. It
emphasises, in particular, that optimal control tech-
niques and activism are likely to create instabilities
in the economic process. It also stresses the basic
stability of the private sector confronting a de-stabi-
lising public sector. This de-stabilisation is linked to
an analysis centered on the entrepreneurial behaviour
of bureaucracies and politicians. This analysis rejects
the <public interest’ theory of government frequently
used in discussions of stabilisation policy.
Why does it seem to have so strong a grip on policy-
makers? Or to put the question in other terms: Why
do governments inflate when there are no benefits to
be derived from such action?
Is it really so? We need to look more carefully.
The apparent intractability of inflation cannot be
explained in terms of the linkages and interactions
of the economic process. A radical and sustained
reduction of monetary growth belo\v a critical bench-
mark level determined by a country’s institutional
environment would effectively remove over time any
inflation. The relevant question should thus be ad-
dressed to central banks, treasuries and beyond to
the nature of the political process shaping the behav-
iour of these institutions.
Three major channels have unleashed over the past
12 years in various countries excessive rates of mone-
tary growth. One channel works via large and persis-
tent government deficits and corresponding pressures
on the central bank to finance the deficit. Italy offers
a classic example in this respect. Major groups, in-
cluding the bureaucracy, find it advantageous to
expand the budget. This behaviour is motivated by
the wealth transfers produced with the expansion of
the budget.
Another channel functions via large and increasing
loans made directly or indirectly by central banks to
commercial banks. Such loan expansion accelerates
the monetary base and ultimately raises monetary
growth rates. There emerges under the circumstances
an apparently uncontrollable monetary growth. But
this uncontrollability essentially results from the cen-
tral bank’s unwillingness, or political inability, to
adjust the interest rate charged on central bank ac-
commodation to the realities of the market place.
France and Belgium offer some usefnl illustration in
this context. The crucial link in the inflationary proc-
ess under the circumstances is the political liability
burdening the central bank’s interest rate policies.
And these liabilities reflect again implicit wealth
transfers motivating the political constraints.
Lastly, determined efforts to maintain an under-
valued exchange rate produce extensive interventions
on the foreign exchange markets. These interventions
are converted via an acceleration of the monetary
base into <uncontrollable’ rates of monetary growth.
Maintenance of an undervalued exchange rate in-
volves an abdication of monetary control. Domestic
monetary growth is necessarily tied in this case to
the inflationary policies of the leading nations. This
policy reflects usually, the evident interests of major
export industries. It involves again an implicit trans-
fer of wealth, and it is this which lies behind the
political pattern we observe.
So what are the fundamental mistakes made by
those with whom you disagree?
Let us take the OECD as an illustrative example.
The OECD vigorously preaches activist financial
expansionism as a solution to the major problems of
unemployment and low growth. It is caught in old
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conceptions and its bureaucracy seems unable to
open a meaningful discussion of newer scientific
developments. The measured rates of unemployment
and sagging investment expenditures that have been
recorded in recent years do not reflect a ‘deficient
aggregate demand problem’ of the nature experienced
in the 1930s. The role of supply factors and the effect
of institutions and policies on incentives to work and
to invest, arc basic factors not sufficiently recognised
in traditional ‘Keynesian’ conceptions of the world.
Do you think that price stability is the only eco-
nomic objective a government should have?
Hardly. It is an important objective, but the
government’s essential function should be to provide
a stable and predictable framework for the rules of
the social game. This will never satisfy the social
activist however. But I urge you to consider that
social activism tends to produce institutions which
lower our living standards and, ultimately, via
a persistent growth of government, endanger our
freedom,
Is it a fundamental assumption of your position
that the real economy is inherently self-stabiiising?
Yes. The Keynesian tradition proceeded on the view
that the market system is inherently unstable or prone
to settle, whenever left alone, around activity levels
substantially below ‘potential output’. This perspec-
tive, supplemented with the ‘public interest theory’
of government, explains the activist approach to
‘stabiisation policy’. We contend on the other hand
that the market system is a shock-absorbing and self-
regulating system with built-in stabilising properties.
We also contend that the problem can be approached
beyond metaphysies and ideology as an issue to
be assessed by proper procedures of empirical
examinalion.
A soft version of monetarism would allosc the
authorities to use fiscal policy •in a discretionary
manner, to offset swings in the business cycle, tchilst
•insisting that they finance any budget deficits in a
non-infiationary way. You, however, believe In
balanced budgets. Why?
This kind of ‘soft monetarism’ offers no adequate
solution. It encourages actually the bad patterns
inherited from the past. It implicitly assumes that
the ‘government’ attends to the public interest and
can be relied upon to adjust the budget according
to ‘the needs of stabilisation policies’. This seems to
be somewhat naive in our judgment. The political
process increasingly produces a persistent deficit and
larger budgets in the absence of well understood
and widely accepted constitutional rules confining
the government’s fiscal operation. Moreover, a per-
sistent deficit lowers the likelihood of proper mone-
tary control.
It is often said that monetarists are good at laying
down the ground-rules for some ultimate state where
a monetary rule can be applied, but not at describing
how we get there from the present. Is there force in
this criticism?
None whatsoever. The assertion depends essentially
on a tacit constraint imposed on monetarist proposals
designed to move the economy towards a non-infla-
tionary growth path. Our opposition claims that no
anti-inflationary policies be admitted which lower
temporarily employment and output. Such a condition
rules out any meaningful anti-inflationary campaign.
This is not because we desire lower employment and
output. We desire to stabilise the economy around
a stable price level and this requires, at this stage,
a persistent reduction of monetary growth. This re-
duction, unfortunately, may produce a temporary
decline of employment and output. The likelihood of
this result increases with the length, magnitude and
variability of the inflationary episode. But the fact
remains that there is no other way to control infla-
tion. I should also mention that the Shadow Open
Market Committee in the United States and the
Shadow European Economic Committee have repeat-
edly stated the policies required for the transition
period.
A new term has recently crept into the discussion of
economic policy, after <crowding out’. This is ‘the
wedge’, Could you explain what this is?
‘The wedge’ refers to the widening gap between
the cost to the employer of employing a unit of
labour and the net wage received by the employee.
This wedge affects various aspects of unemployment
inaccessible to manipulation by aggregate demand.
It is remarkable how frequently governments, as
recently in England and Sweden, cope with labour
market or budget problems with measures which in-
crease the size of the wedge and thus intensify
labour market problems. An increase in the wedge
lowers employment and lengthens the average dura-
tion of unemployment.
Another common criticism of monetarism is that it
sacrifices all other objectives of policy to that of
achieving price stability. For instance, to attain price
stability interest rates might have to go to such a
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level as •to damage investment. Hoic do you answer
that criticism?
The issue is simply this: the social cost of persis-
tent inflation exceeds, in our judgment, the social
cost of a once-and-for-all return to a stable price
level. Persistent inflation does not proceed in the
pleasing fashion of a smooth and fully anticipated
path involving fully-adjusted institutions and be-
haviour. It is an erratic process with large uncertain-
ties generating large variations in real growth and a
comparatively high level of normal unemployment.
The road leading out of inflation is costly and un-
pleasant indeed, but the alternative is much worse.
And as to interest rates, even politicians learn on
occasion that the best way to lower interest rates
permanently is to lower the rate of inflation. Of
course, the reversal of the inflationary trend induces
temporary increases in rates of interest. But accept-
ance of permanent inflation, in order to prevent a
temporary rise in interest rates, is a typical example
of the policies responsible for the contemporary mess.
Why have no central banks adopted a fixed mane-
tary rule?
\‘Vhat are a central bank’s incentives to do so? The
traditional procedures serve in general the established
bureaucracies much better. They offer more oppor-
tunities for evasive rhetoric. In particular, they permit
banks to claim credit for good conditions and allow
useful disclaimers of responsibility for bad develop-
ments (eg inflation). It is still remarkable to observe,
however, that some central banks are approaching
a policy of monetary control which need not involve
a fixed rule of rigidly constant growth.
Having monetary targets seems in some ways to
make it m.ore difficult for a cc ~tral bank to control
the money stock. For instance, when monatary
growth overshoots the target, institutions stop buy-
ing government debt because they anticipate higher
interest rates and this in turn boosts such monetary
expansion. What is your anssver?
This involves two aspects. One bears on the insti-
tutions governing the quality of monetary control.
Many central banks (France, Belgium, Germany,
England and others) proceed under arrangements
which substantially lower the likelihood of pursuing
effective monetary control. Inappropriate institutions
may effectively obstruct any rational monetary man-
agement. Gentral banks frequently disregard this
issue and fail to recognise the importance of develop-
ing monetary arrangements which raise the degree
of monetary control. Control will never be perfect
and the question about speculation induced by devia-
tions from the desired growth path continues to
attract attention. But such deviations hardly affect
securities with longer maturities. Given a credible
policy of monetary control, investors will know that
short-run errors in monetary growth will approxi-
mately wash out over time. Any short-run overshoot-
ing of monetary targets will not produce a decline
in bond prices under such circumstances. It is even
doubtful that very short-term rates would be seriously
destabilised. Interest rates seem much more prone to
fluctuate in response to policies geared to stabiise
interest rates.
Civen international mobility of capital. an attempt
by a single country to control money by raising
interest rates may, it is argued, result simply in an
inflow of capital which will swell the money suppl.y
further. Do not small open economies have to accept
the international inflation rate?
Most definitely not. Switzerland has not accepted
the prevailing international rate of inflation. A regime
of floating exchange rates offers each country an
opportunity to determine the monetary base to the
last cent in accordance with its wishes. This implies
approximate control of monetary growth, irrespective
of capital flows induced by relative interest rates or
relative movements of exchange rates and interest
rates.
Dawe have to accept that exchange rates are
bound to be volatile?
The volatility of exchange rates simply reflects the
uncertainty about the course of financial policy in
various countries. Substantial revisions in the markets’
evaluation of future policies are immediately im-
pounded into the current exchange rate. A stable
and reliable course of financial policies reduces the
fluctuations in exchange rates. No degree of inter-
vention can be a substitute for proper financial
policies. Intervention undermines monetary control
(Germany and Switzerland) and affects exchange
rates beyond the shortest horizon only in cases where
markets revise (in response to persistent interven-
tion) their expectations of the course of monetary
policy.
Nevertheless central banks seem to he intervening
on a larger and larger scale in the markets. \Vh.y
is this?
Whether the magnitude of intervention increases
remains to be seen. To some extent interventions are
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without operating on domestic credit markets or
manipulating advances to banks. But the major force
behind the massive intervention is probably concern
about the short-run effects on export industries.
Monetarist analysis has recently been applied to
many areas beyond its original and continuing con-
cern with monetary policy — far instance, to the
economics of bureaucracies.
The connection between monetarist analysis and
the emerging work on non-market institutions and
the political process is the systematic use of proper
economic analysis in both fields of research. There
is no monetarist analysis of bureaucracy but there
is indeed an analysis of bureaucracy. The motivation
of this work lies in the increasing range and impor-
tance of the phenomenon.
Is this new economic approach going to put the
sociologists out of business?
Hardly. More likely is the expanding application
and use by sociologists of the analytic framework
developed over many decades in economics. This
development is visible in political science and also
in psychology.
Manetarism has the reputation of being a hard,
even heartless doctrine. Ilow would you answer such
a charge?
What is more heartless than irresponsible and
foolish advice, or false promises? The hard problems
do not change under a deceitful rhetoric. We have
experienced rising and erratic inflation, increasing
‘unemployment’ and lower rates of real growth as a
result of ‘warm-hearted’ policies. It is time to pene-
trate beyond this cloud of verbalism. \‘Ve cannot
expect to cope effectively with difficult problems
under an essentially immoral commitment to refuse
a hard and honest examination of the nature of the
issues.